The paper analyzes the implications of a subsidy policy on education and different liberalized trade and investment policies on the incidence of child labour in a developing economy in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with informal sector and child labour. The supply function of child labour is endogenously determined. The paper shows that different policies, if undertaken concurrently, may produce mutually contradictory effects, thereby producing little or no impact on the incidence of child labour. The paper provides a theoretical answer as to why the incidence of child labour has not significantly declined in the developing economies in spite of economic development and globalization.
means of livelihood. To eradicate the incidence of child labour, World Development Report 1995 called for a multifaceted approach with programmes that increase income security, reduce education costs, and improve the quality schooling. However, policy prescriptions directed towards poverty alleviation are difficult to be implemented properly due to various bottlenecks and vicious circles typical of developing economies; even if implemented, they take a long time to mitigate the problem, so that legal restrictions can be more instrumental to deal with child labour. Legislative fiats to combat child labour range from an outright ban on child labour to social labeling of products. However, a total ban would be counterproductive in the sense that it may adversely affect the welfare of the poor households and force the children to take resort to more hazardous and illegal activities. Moreover, most of the children work in domestic service or informal sector, where labour law enforcement is virtually absent. Social labeling can be applied only to a few products (mostly exported ones), so that the potential effect is limited; it is also difficult to monitor the labeling operations and may have disastrous consequences on the developing economies as the Bangladeshi experience 4 has shown. It is believed that the betterment of educational opportunities and a policy of compulsory education designed for human capital formation can more effectively remove children from work.
The ongoing process of globalization was expected to produce considerable downward pressure on the problem of child labour in the developing countries by reducing the extent of poverty.
Over the last two decades there have been many groundbreaking changes in the global scenario.
The multilateral agreement and the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), resultant of the Uruguay round of discussions, have brought about revolutionary changes in liberalizing international trade across countries whether developed or developing. Radical measures for reducing tariff barriers and completely doing away with non-tariff barriers to ensure freer global trade have already been undertaken in manufacturing commodities. However, the attempt to subject agricultural commodities to disciplines similar to those that govern trade in manufactures has not so far been successful. The WTO is now embarking upon a new round of negotiations on agricultural trade. Multilateral liberalization in the context of the WTO negotiations will 4 Owing to the possibility of introduction of the US Harkins Bill, which calls for complete ban on imports of any good that were manufactured wholly or partly by child workers, the employers in the booming garments industry in Bangladesh that had employed a large number of child labourers began removing the child workers drastically. The consequence was a chaotic process that left many children worse off than they had before. See UNICEF (1997) .
primarily imply reduced protection against imports and reduced subsidies for domestic production, including reduced export subsidies. If the result of reduced trade barriers and increased international competition are uniform in both developed or developing countries, the prices of the primary agricultural exports of the developing countries are likely to rise because of the probable reduction of the multilateral tariffs by the large trading countries and increase in their import demands. Model simulations of multilateral trade liberalization, e.g. (Hoekman and Anderson, 1999) are quite unanimous in predicting that such liberalization would result in higher world market prices than otherwise for those goods currently being protected and subsidized.
During this period the problem of child labour has drawn serious cognizance and calls for different policy measures to curb the evil. It was believed that liberalized economic policies would take the developing countries into higher growth orbits, the benefits of which would definitely percolate down to the bottom of the society, thereby leading to reduction of poverty and poverty-driven child labour incidence. Despite most of the developing economies choosing free trade as their development strategies, empirical evidence suggests that in many of the transition economies the incidence of child labour has been on the rise. For example, a recent study of child labour by Swaminathan (1998) in a city in western India concluded: "The prevalence and absolute expansion of child labor in a period and region of relatively high growth of aggregate output indicates that the nature of economic growth is flawed". Why liberalized trade policies and free education policy have not so far been successful in eradicating the problem is quite puzzling.
In the recent theoretical literature on child labour the notable contributors are Eswaran (1996) , Basu and Van (1998) , Ranjan (2001) , Baland and Robinson (2000) , Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) and Dessy (2000) . Eswaran (1996) has found an explanation in the need for old age security of the parents behind the incidence of high fertility rate and lower investment on the education of their offspring (and hence the high incidence of child labour) in a backward society where the child mortality rate is quite high. Thus he has suggested improvement in healthcare services and legislation of compulsory education to eradicate child labour from the system. Basu and Van (1998) have shown that if child labour and adult labour are substitutes (Substitution Axiom) and if child leisure is a luxury commodity to the poor households (Luxury Axiom), unfavourable adult labour market, responsible for low adult wage rate, is the driving force behind the incidence of child labour. According to the Luxury Axiom, there exists a critical level of adult wage rate, and any adult worker earning below this wage rate, considers himself as poor and does not have the luxury to send his offspring to schools. He is forced to send his children to the job market to supplement low family income out of sheer poverty. What follows from the Basu and Van (1998) paper is that labour market interventions that raise adults' wages are expected to mitigate the problem of child labour. There are some papers in the literature focusing on capital market failure. Ranjan (1999) , Baland and Robinson (2000) and Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) emphasize the importance of capital-market imperfection as a contributing factor to inefficient child labor. The dynamic implications of capital market imperfection have been studied by Ranjan (2001) , with similar conclusions reached by Basu (1999) . On the other hand, Dessy (2000) has advocated in favour of imposition of compulsory education as a means to combat the incidence of child labour. Dessy (2000) has shown that in an economy where the benefits of having children are outweighed by rearing costs, a policy of free education with no compulsory education laws, may lead the economy to an underdevelopment trap with high fertility rate and higher incidence of child labour. On the contrary, a compulsory education policy is expected to eradicate the existence of the evil from the system.
Unfortunately, the existing theoretical literature on child does not deal adequately 5 with issues like the supply of child labour and its linkages with the adult labour markets in a multi-sector general equilibrium framework, which is especially crucial when child labour and adult labour are substitutes 6 in different informal sectors of a developing economy. One cannot get the overall effect of a policy on the incidence of child labour in a partial equilibrium framework. This is because, as the Bangladeshi experience has shown, a policy designed to mitigate the problem of child labour in a targeted sector may drive the children into other sectors of the economy and undertake illegal and more hazardous activities. So, one cannot evaluate the success of a particular policy unless one takes into account its effect on the aggregate number of child workers, spread over different sectors of a developing economy. Neither do we find any work where the effect of an education subsidy policy on the supply of child labour has been studied although the traditional wisdom recommends a hike in educational opportunities to eradicate the problem. Also, economists have not so far paid adequate attention to analyze the implications of 5 The Basu and Van (1998) model, of course, can be easily embedded in a general equilibrium framework. Besides, Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) and Gupta (2002) have examined the efficacy of imposition of trade sanctions on export items of the developing countries produced by child labour as a policy in curbing the incidence of child labour in terms of general equilibrium models.
the liberalized economic policies on the problem of child labour. 7 This attempt should have been made earlier, especially when trade liberalization was expected to exert downward pressures on the incidence of poverty-driven child labour.
The present paper is purported to examine the implications of an education subsidy policy and liberalized economic policies on the incidence of poverty-induced child labour in a general equilibrium setup. We consider a three-sector full-employment model with informal sector and child labour. The economy is divided into two informal and one formal sectors. One of the two informal sectors (sector X ) produces an exportable agricultural commodity, while the other (sectorY ) produces a non-traded intermediary 8 for the formal manufacturing sector (sector Z ).
Sector Z is the import-competing sector of the economy and is protected by an import tariff.
Child labour is used in the two informal sectors. It is assumed that different economic activities are perfectly substitutable 9 between adult and child labour (see Basu (1999) ). The adult workers employed in the two informal sectors of the economy constitute the poorer section of the working population and the supply of child labour comes entirely from these poor families. The supply function of child labour is endogenously determined. In this setup we shall show that a subsidy policy on education and liberalized trade and investment policies may produce mutually 7 Chaudhuri and Gupta (2004) and Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2005) are two of the few notable exceptions.
8 If one considers a vertically integrated production structure, the inclusion of a non-tradable intermediate good-producing sector does not make any sense in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework. If there is any intermediary it must be an internationally traded one. However, in the present model the inclusion of a non-traded intermediary is worthwhile since the wage rates in the final good and intermediate good-producing sectors differ. While in the formal final goodproducing sector the employees get the unionized wage, the workers in the intermediary sector receive only the low competitive wage.
9 In the developing economies child workers are mostly found in the production of carpets, glass, bangles, leather bags, shoes, garments, matchbox and fireworks and cattle feeding. It is sensible to assume that adults can perform all these tasks. First, all these industries exist in countries where there is no child labour. Second, not all the firms producing these goods in countries where child labour exists actually use child labour− after all, this is the justification for 'social labelling'. The 'nimble fingers' argument, which once has been put forward, especially to carpet weaving, is an excuse given by employers and fails to convince researchers (see Burra (1995) and Weiner (1991) Joshi and Joshi (1976) , Bose (1978) , Papola (1981) and Romatet (1983) . However, there are a few theoretical papers like Grinols (1991) , Chandra and Khan (1993) and Gupta (1997) , which have formalized the urban informal sector as a sector that produces an internationally traded final commodity.
The formal sector is the tariff protected import-competing sector producing a manufacturing good, Z . It uses adult labour, capital and the produced input from the informal sector. Owing to effective wage legislation and unionization of labour, the adult wage rate in the formal sector, * W , is greater than the competitive informal sector adult wage rate, W .
11
Production functions in sectors X and Y satisfy constant returns to scale with positive but diminishing returns to each factor. But, fixed-coefficient technology 12 is assumed for sector Z .
Markets except the formal sector labour market are perfectly competitive and all inputs are fully employed. Owing to the small open economy assumption prices of the traded goods, X and Z are given internationally. Since Y is non-traded its price is endogenously determined by the demand-supply mechanism. We assume that sectors Y and Z as a whole is more capital intensive 13 than sector X .
The following symbols will be used in the formal presentation of the model.
In a developing economy the supply of child labour comes from the poor working families employed in the informal sectors. Their incomes from non-child labour sources are quite low and uncertain. In the rural areas, workers get employment in the peak season. But in the lean season, employment is not guaranteed, as the demand for labour remains low. It has been observed that the market for child labour remains relatively stable throughout the year as child workers are mainly employed to look after the cattle (see Gupta 2000) . Therefore, the poor families often send out their children to work for the purpose of 'consumption smoothing'. In urban areas also there is very little employment security for the workers employed in the informal sectors. The present analysis, unfortunately, cannot take into consideration the aspect of income uncertainty on the part of informal sector workers. However, there is no reason to deny that the incidence of child labour is likely to fall significantly if the poor working families are protected by employment security and social security.
12 This is a simplifying assumption. As sector Z uses more than two inputs in production, unless fixed-coefficient technology is assumed, the algebra of the model will be seriously complicated by the presence of partial elasticities of substitutions when one considers the effects of any changes in the price system. However, as the system possesses the decomposition property the usual CRS production function may be considered when one analyzes the effects of any changes in the output system.
13 Chandra and Khan (1993) and Gupta (1997) have also made this assumption. However, in these papers, the Harris-Todaro framework has been considered. 
number of adult workers employed in the two informal sectors; = K aggregate stock of capital of the economy (domestic plus foreign); = E amount of subsidy on education; = n number of children in each working family; = ∧' ' proportional change.
Derivation of Supply Function of Child Labour
We assume that there are L numbers of working families in the economy, which are classified into two groups with respect to the earnings of their adult members. The adult workers who work in the higher paid formal manufacturing sector comprise the richer section of the working population. On the contrary, labourers who are engaged in the informal sectors constitute the poorer section. Following the 'Luxury Axiom' 14 of Basu and Van (1998) we assume that there exists a critical level of family (or adult labour) income, W , from non-child labour sources, such that the parents will send their children out to work if and only if the actual adult wage rate is less than this critical level. We can easily assume that each worker in the formal manufacturing sector earns a wage income, * W , sufficiently greater than this critical level. So, the workers belonging to this group do not send their children to work. On the other hand, adult workers employed in the informal sectors earn W amount of wage income, which is less than W and therefore, send many of their children to the job market to supplement low family income.
The supply function of child labour by each poor working family is determined from the utility maximizing behaviour of the representative altruistic household. We assume that each working family consists of one adult member and 'n' number of children. The altruistic adult member of the family (guardian) decides the number of children to be sent to the work place. The rest of the children are sent to schools. We also assume that there is only public educational system
15, 16
available to the children in the economy and it is entirely financed by government subsidy on this account. The richer section of the workers does not send their children to the job market. In a society with high fertility rate, poor perception of the parents about future benefits of children's education, low quality of schooling and households' objectives to maximize present income, one of the main motives behind the decision of the poorer households in sending some of their 14 An empirically testable hypothesis of Basu and Van's model is that child labour arises if adult household income falls below some benchmark level. This hypothesis has been tested by different economists for different countries. Studies by Ray (1999) for India, Ray (2000) for Pakistan and Peru, Addison et al. (1997) for Ghana and Pakistan and Bhalotra (2000) for Pakistan have found the 'Luxury Axiom' of Basu and Van (1998) more or less to be statistically valid.
15 Governments all over the world devote substantial resources to their education sector. This is especially true in developing countries. In 1995, public spending on education accounted for 15.7% of total government expenditure in developing countries (see Bedi and Garg (2000) ). Furthermore, the majority of students in developing countries are educated in publicly funded and publicly managed educational institutions. According to Jimenez and Lockheed (1995) , almost 90% of all primary and 70% of all secondary enrollments in developing countries are in public schools.
offspring to public schools is to derive the immediate benefits of free education policy. 17 In the public education system in the developing economies there are provisions for the children from the poorer families to get stipend, free educational goods and free mid-day meals. It is sensible to assume that higher the subsidy on education, E , the higher would be the free educational facilities and the related benefits, , B associated with child schooling. On the other hand, the larger the number of children sent to schools the higher would be the aggregate benefits accrued to the poor families. We make the simplifying assumption that the money value of such benefits is strictly proportional to the number of children sent to schools. The utility function of the household is given by )) ( , , (
The household derives utility from the consumption of the final goods and from the children's leisure. However, children's leisure here does not imply that the children who are not sent out to work are kept at home. They are sent to schools.
18 The altruistic guardian of the family derives utility from this source because at least some of his children have been kept out from the work hazards. Besides, by sending some of the children to schools, the family secures current income gain from access to the different incentives that the free education scheme provides. For analytical simplicity let us consider the following Cobb-Douglas type of the utility function. It satisfies all the standard properties and it is homogeneous of degree 1. The parameter γ denotes the degree of altruism of the guardian towards the well being of his children. The value of γ crucially depends on the social values and norms of the society towards child labour. In a relatively educationally advanced society the value of γ is likely to be comparatively high.
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Ruling out the possibility for any child worker attending school to undertake any part time job, the budget constraint of the representative poor household is given by the following.
where, W is the income of the adult worker, 
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Maximization of the utility function subject to the above budget constraint gives us the following first-order conditions.
From (3) we get the following expressions.
Substitution of the values of X C and Z C into the budget constraint and simplification give us the following labour supply function.
This is the supply function of child labour by each poor family. We now analyze its properties. 
Differentiating (6.1) with respect to W we get 
The General Equilibrium Analysis
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets the usual price-unit cost equality conditions relating to the three sectors of the economy are given by the following three equations.
The formal sector faces a unionized labour market. The relationship for the unionized wage rate is specified as:
(.) f satisfies the following properties:
Equation (11) states that in the absence of any bargaining power of the trade unions i.e. when , 0 = U the formal and informal sector wage rates are equal. However, the formal sector wage rate, *, W exceeds the competitive informal sector wage rate, , W when there is at least some power to the trade unions. The unionized wage is scaled upward as the informal wage rate rises.
Also with an increase in the bargaining power, the unions bargain for a higher wage.
Using (11), equation (10) 
As in the two informal sectors child labour and adult labour are perfectly substitutes, the effective adult labour endowment equation of the economy is given by the following.
Assuming that each formal sector firm has a separate trade union, the unionized wage function may be derived as a solution to the Nash bargaining game between the representative firm and the representative union in the formal sector industry. This function has been derived in Chaudhuri (2003) . Using (7) and (12) and after simplification this may be rewritten as follows.
In this model there are eight endogenous variables (namely,
and C L ) and eight independent equations (namely, equations (7), (8), (9), (10.1), (11) and (12) − (14)). The parameters of the system are:
and . n Equations (8), (9) and (10.1) constitute the price system and the rest of the equations form the output system. We should note that the system possesses the decomposition property since the three unknown input prices, R W , and Y P , can be determined from the price system alone, independently of the output system. Once the factor prices are known the factor coefficients, s a ji , are also known. As W is already known, * W is obtained from (11). X and Z are simultaneously solved from equations (13) and (14). Given Z the equilibrium value of Y is found from (12). Finally, C L is obtained from equation (7).
Comparative Static Exercises:
The conventional wisdom suggests that an improvement of the educational facilities would bring about a significant reduction in the incidence of child labour. Also it is believed that liberalized trade and investment policies would take the developing countries into higher growth orbits, the benefits of which would percolate down to the poor people, thereby lowering the extent of poverty. Thus these policies were expected to exert downward pressures on the incidence of poverty-induced child labour. In this section of the paper, we shall examine the effectiveness of these policies to control the supply of child labour. Although, different liberalized policies in trade and investment and a free education policy are undertaken simultaneously in a developing economy, to fix our ideas we consider their effects one by one.
Totally differentiating equations (8), (9) (14) and (13) We shall now try to interpret the necessary and sufficient condition (given by (21)) for λ to be negative (positive). We should remember that each adult worker employed in the two informal sectors sends C l number of his children to the job market and the rest are sent to schools. On the other hand, labourers engaged in the formal sector of the economy constitute the richer section of the working class and do not send their children to the job market. In the two informal sectors adult labour and child labour are perfect substitutes. So, the effective adult labour endowment of the economy including child labour is given by 
+ +
The left-hand side of (21) gives the difference between the actual labour-capital ratio of sector X and the effective labour-capital ratio of sector Z . This difference is positive because it is sensible to assume that the agricultural sector (sector X ) is more labour intensive vis-à-vis the aggregate industrial sector (i.e. sectors Z and Y taken together). Now turning back to interpreting the right-hand side of (21) (21) gives the ratio between the forgone labour endowment and aggregate amount of capital used in the industrial sectors. Thus, λ is negative (positive) under the necessary and sufficient condition that the latter ratio must be greater (less) than the difference between the labour-capital ratios of the agricultural and the industrial sectors. We should note that the ji a s depend on the unknown factor prices, which in turn depend on the parameters in the price system like, Finally, totally differentiating equation (7) using (15), (19) and (20) and simplifying we can derive the following expression.
, 26
25 See the Appendix for detailed derivations.
26 It may be an interesting idea to carry out a comparative static exercise with respect γ . The parameter denoting the degree of altruism on the part of the guardian of a poor working family depends crucially on the social values and tradition. Owing to mass literacy and adult education programmes and vigorous public campaign against child labour social values and tradition may change over time and raise the value of γ . From equation (6.1) it is easy to check that an increase in γ lowers the supply of child labour from each poor family, C l . To find out the effect on the aggregate supply of child labour in the economy after differentiating equation (7) with respect to γ and using (15) and (19) 
From (22) we find that
Let us now explain these results intuitively. We note that any policy change affects the supply of child labour in two ways: (i) through a change in the size of the informal sector labour force,
, as these families are considered to be the suppliers of child labour (we call this the labour reallocation effect); and, (ii) through a change in C l (the number of child workers supplied by each poor family), which results either from a change in the adult wage rate, W , or from a change in the benefit derived from sending children to schools, An inflow of foreign capital cannot change the factor prices including the informal sector adult wage rate, W , as the production system possesses the decomposition property. So the supply of child labour from each poor working family, C l , does not change. However, it produces a Rybczynski effect leading to a contraction (expansion) of sector Z and an expansion (contraction) of sector X if and only if . 0 ) (> < λ As sector Z contracts (expands), more (less) adult workers would now be employed in the two informal sectors than before. Consequently, the number of poor families, from which the supply of child labour comes, increases (decreases). This is the labour reallocation effect. The supply of child labour in the economy increases (decreases) following an inflow of foreign capital if and only if . 0 ) (> < λ On the other hand, an increase in the subsidy on education affects the incidence of child labour in two ways. First, it lowers the effective price of child labour,
This lowers the supply of child labour from each family, C l . This is the direct effect of the policy, which exerts a downward pressure on the incidence of child labour. Second, an induced effect is generated as the direct effect lowers the number of available child labour and hence the effective adult labour endowment of the economy. From (22) it is easy to check that liberalization policies are adopted in a developing economy concomitantly, the net effect on the incidence of child labour may be uncertain.
Concluding Remarks:
Abject poverty and lack of educational facilities are often cited in the literature as the primary factors responsible for the incidence of child labour in the developing economies. Liberalized trade and investment policies and provision of better and free education were often recommended as remedial measures. Trade and investment liberalization programs are supposed to reduce poverty by raising the growth rates of these economies, thereby putting a brake on the incidence of poverty-induced child labour. On the other hand, betterment of educational facilities coupled with allied incentive schemes would also be able to deliver the goods by keeping the children from poor families into schools and refraining them from entering the job market. Over the last two decades, the developing economies have gone in for economic liberalization in a big way.
Several drastic measures have been implemented to ensure a freer international trade. Also, provisions have been made for ensuring free and better educational opportunities. However, what empirical evidence from several countries in transition reveals is not quite encouraging. The incidence of child labour has decreased over the last few decades but not at the expected rate.
Even in some high growth-prone areas, the incidence has been on the rise. Why globalization and betterment of educational opportunities have not so far been able to produce the desired results is quite puzzling. The present paper has made an attempt to provide a theoretical answer to the above question in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with informal sector and child labour.
The paper has shown that if different trade and investment liberalization programs and a free education policy are undertaken simultaneously in a transition economy, their overall effect on the supply of child labour may not be quite satisfactory as different policies produce mutually opposite effects on the incidence of child labour, thereby nullifying each other's effects, at least partially. For example, when , 0 > λ an inflow of foreign capital or a hike in education subsidy exerts a downward pressure on the incidence of child labour while a policy of tariff reform or trade liberalization in agriculture accentuates the problem. On the contrary, the former two policies raise the child labour incidence while the latter policies produce the opposite effect when .
< λ
The actual sign of λ depends on the parameters of the system. So, taking into account all parameter values, the policymakers of the country should decide which policies ought to be given priority and carried out in order to mitigate the incidence of poverty-induced child labour in the system.
APPENDIX:
1.
Totally differentiating equations (8), (9) (15) and (16) presented in the text.
2.
Totally differentiating equation (14) one gets the following.
is the effective adult labour endowment of the economy. Thus, 
Using (15) and (16) 
3.
Totally differentiating equation (7) we write (15) and (19), the above expression can be rewritten as follows. 
